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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The project is to provide Yara International ASA with information regarding the Indian fertilizer 
subsidy policy.  
 
The problem definition for the research part of the project is as follows: 
 
“How does the Indian fertilizer subsidy policy regime influence the Indian environment, and will 
there be any changes in the fertilizer subsidy policy in the future?” 
 
Yara International ASA operates worldwide, and their core business is to be a provider of 
fertilizers. Due to the present fertilizer subsidy policy in India, it is now crucial for Yara 
International ASA to predict possible future changes in India’s policy. Because the present policy is 
not making the profits needed for Yara International ASA to sustain their operations, they are now 
at a stage where strategic decisions to either leave India’s market or continue further operations is 
needed. 
 
The report is divided into five parts; Part one is the introduction and covers the research details as 
well as information about Yara International ASA. Part two covers the literature review, where we 
inform about the social, political, environmental, technological and economical impact of subsidies. 
Part three covers our research methodology. Part four presents our case study about India, our 
analysis, and our findings. In part five, we present our recommendations for Yara International 
ASA. The recommendations are based on the findings from the literature review and the case study 
(secondary data) of India. Finally we present our conclusion. 
 
Based on the findings in this study, we will recommend Yara International ASA to continue their 
operation in India, and keep on their joint venture with Kribcho. 
Because it is likely that the fertilizer subsidy policy in India will in the future change.  
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 Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Yara International ASA has operated in the India fertilizer sector for more than a 
decade, and is now moving from being a strong supplier of certain key fertilizer 
products, to becoming a knowledge provider and a specialist in plant nutrition. 
In 2007 Yara International ASA, agreed on a joint venture with the Indian 
fertilizer company Kribhco, with the purpose to produce and market fertilizers in 
the Indian market.  
The President and CEO of Yara International ASA, Thorleif Enger, said that: 
“Our new partnership with Kribhco is a strong fit between their distribution 
position in one of the world’s biggest and fastest growing fertilizer markets, and 
our global sourcing and leadership on NPKs" 
But, Yara International ASA`s market presence has not been stable and 
continuous, mainly because of India’s subsidy policy regime that exists today. 
The Indian government are only subsidizing the local producers, which make it 
difficult for Yara International ASA to compete with the local producer’s output-
price to the farmers. Because of the subsidy regime, Yara International ASA is at 
a stage where strategic decisions to either leave India’s market or continue further 
operations is needed. Therefore it is crucial for Yara International ASA to 
understand the current subsidy regimes to help them in estimating possible 
changes to develop a better future strategy. More specifically, we seek to 
understand “how the Indian fertilizer subsidy policy regime influence the Indian 
environment, and if there will be any future changes in the policy”.  
1.1 Research Objectives 
 
We address this issue by first understanding why subsidies are needed in the first 
place? What affects the fertilizing subsidies has on the farmers and producers? 
How do other countries subsidize agriculture and what affects have there been 
when withdrawing the fertilizer subsidies? What is the context of fertilizer 
subsidies in India? What impacts the fertilizer subsidy policy has on India, at a 
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Macro level? Are there any differences in the opinions surrounding fertilizing 
policies within the Indian political environment? 
1.2 A review on Yara International ASA 
 
Yara International ASA is a global chemical company that converts energy and 
nitrogen from the air into essential products for farmers and industrial customers. 
As the number one global supplier of mineral fertilizers, Yara International ASA 
helps provide food and renewable energy for a growing world population.        
Yara International ASA’s vision is to “aim for industry shaper performance”. 
Yara International ASA is uniquely equipped and committed to driving industry-
shaping performance through operational excellence, profitable growth and people 
development. Yara International ASA's safety and environmental record shall be 
of the highest standard. Yara International ASA’s mission is to”Strive for better 
yield”. Yara International ASA wants to deliver good returns for farmers and 
industrial customers, and returns that create satisfied owners. 
Yara International ASA will strive to deliver on both short-term and long-term 
performance. Yara International ASA will never sacrifice long-term performance 
for short-term payoffs, and will never use long-term focus as an excuse for short-
term performance. (Yara International ASA 2008)  
1.3 Yara International ASA in India 
 
Yara International ASA has during the past decade been exporting fertilizer to the 
Indian market. With more than 100 years experience in the fertilizer market, they 
are in a unique position to sell their products and succeed in India. And after joint 
venturing with Kribhco, which is the largest agriculture cooperative in India, their 
chances of success are strengthened.   
 
This paper starts with an examination of the literature by using the PESTEL 
model to understand the rationale of why subsidies exist. In chapter three, we 
present our research method followed by our Case Study in chapter four. We 
present our recommendations and conclusion in the final section, chapter five. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
There are many factors in the macro-environment that will effect the decisions of  
managers in an organization. Tax barriers, new laws, trade barriers, demograpich 
change and government policy changes are all examples of macro change. To help 
analyze these factors managers can categorise them by looking at the Political 
factors, Economical factors, Social factors, Technological factors, Environmental 
factors, and Legal factors, which can be explained through the PESTEL model 
(Oxford University 2007). 
Using the PESTEL model, we are able to explain the Political, Economical, 
Social, Technological, Environmental and the Legal impacts regarding subsidies 
in general and more in depth on fertilizer. 
 
In economics, subsidies are defined as: 
“Financial assistance from the government, such as a grant, tax break, or trade 
barrier, in order to 1: Encourage the production, or 2: To purchase of a good. The 
term subsidy may also refer to assistance granted by others, such as individuals or 
non-government institutions, although this is more commonly described as 
charity.” (Economist.com 2007) 
  
2.1 Socio- Economic arguments for agrarian subsidies 
 
To clarify the definition given above; when there is a positive or negative shift in 
demand and supply, the government uses subsidies to try and stabilize the changes 
in the market, so that the surrounding environment do not suffer from the shifts 
(Appendix 1).  An example to better describe this is that a subsidy that increases 
production will result in a lower price, while a subsidy that increases demand will 
tend to result in an increase in price. The subsidies are often used as an important 
financial instrument for modifying market-determined outcomes. And while taxes 
reduce not reusable income, subsidies inject money into a circulation. In other 
words, taxes appear on the revenue side of government budgets, and subsidies, on 
the expenditure side (Samuelson 1983). 
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At Social level subsidies can have a major impact in helping the welfare of a 
society, as long as these are designed and administered efficiently to serve a 
clearly stated set of objectives (Abboushi 2007). Subsidies can also be very costly, 
if they are weakly designed and inefficiently administered. There are different 
types of subsidies, such as, in education, in health and in environment areas.  
These are introduced on such grounds that the benefits (economical and social) 
are spread well beyond the immediate recipients, and are shared by the population 
at large, present and future. Subsidies are also used with redistributive objectives, 
particularly for ensuring minimum consumption levels of food and other basic 
needs (Abboushi 2007). 
The government can use subsidies, as actions, which limit competition or raise the 
prices at which producers could sell their products, for example, by means of tariff 
protection (Abboushi 2007). Even though many economists may think that 
subsidies may distort the market and produce inefficiencies, there are a number of 
recognized cases where subsidies may be the most efficient solution. As seen in 
Norway, the farmers annual receive subsidies for their meat, to be able to meet 
global market prices (Abboushi 2007). If not subsidized, markets would have 
been forced to set the prices higher and the distributors will import supply from 
other countries, eventually, this will press the Norwegian farmers out of the 
market, due their high production cost (Abboushi 2007).   
At economical level, in many cases it is the economist, who suggest, that direct 
subsidies are the most preferable way to support, even though some argue that 
subsidies are inefficient, and they are often less inefficient than other policy tools 
used to benefit certain groups (Quibria 1987). Direct subsidies may also be more 
transparent, which may allow the political process to have more opportunity to 
eliminate wasteful hidden subsidies. The problem that hidden subsidies are more 
inefficient but often favoured precisely because they are non-transparent, is 
central to the political economy of subsidies (Quibria 1987). And Similar to the 
above arguments, fertilizer subsidies are said to exist if there is a difference 
between the cost (procurement and distribution cost) of fertilizer (to the 
government) and its sale price (to the farmers), if cost exceeds the price, the 
farmer receives a positive subsidy (Jebee 1996). If the price exceeds the cost, the 
farmer receives a negative subsidy. In estimating subsidies, two concepts are 
distinguished, namely, the financial (also called budgetary) subsidy and the 
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economic subsidy (Quibria 1987). The financial subsidy is calculated with 
reference to market prices while the economic subsidy is based on concepts of 
opportunity costs of fertilizers and associated factors. Thus, for calculating the 
economic subsidy, in the case of domestically supplied fertilizers, the appropriate 
price that should be charged to domestic users is the opportunity cost of fertilizer, 
which is equivalent to the f.o.b. (free on board) or c.i.f. (cost insurance freight) 
price plus the appropriate distribution costs. Evidently, the concept of economic 
subsidy is based on financial returns and costs. If the (resource) cost of production 
of domestic fertilizers is higher than its economic price, it is not the farmer but the 
industry, which is receiving subsidies (Quibria 1987). 
2.2 Political and economical arguments for fertilizer subsidies 
 
A number of arguments have been presented to justify fertilizer subsidies. While 
some are strictly economic in nature, others are somewhat politico-economic in 
character. The economic arguments are more often for reasons of economic 
efficiency than of income distribution (Quibria 1987). It is now well known that in 
a first-best world where everything is observable and contractible, there is no need 
for taxes or subsidies to promote efficiency. On the contrary, they lead to losses in 
economic welfare. However, only in the context of second-best world, which is 
characterized by distortions and market imperfections, there isn’t any role for 
taxes and subsidies for promoting efficiency (Quibria 1987). In the following we 
spell out some arguments for fertilizer subsidies and the effect resulting from 
adoption of fertilizer subsidies (Quibria 1987, & Jeebe 1996). 
 
2.2.1 Input subsidy as a means of countervailing distortion in output 
prices 
 
Two types of price policies have been pursued in developing countries, 
namely, the protectionist and the provisionist. A country is said to be 
protectionist if it adopts measures, such as imports tariffs, that hold 
domestic prices above border prices. On the other hand, a country is said 
to be provisionist if it adopts measures to hold domestic prices below 
border prices (Quibria 1987). An abiding logic for maintaining a 
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provisionist price policy for food commodities has been largely politico-
economic. It is part of an implicit social contract of every modern society 
to ensure food and other basic necessities to the masses at prices 
affordable to them so that they suffer no privations in elementary human 
necessities. For some export crops, it is uncommon that the producer 
prices are held below border prices (world prices). The export taxes are 
imposed principally to satisfy the revenue needs of government, but on 
occasions they may be imposed to exploit the monopolistic position of the 
country in a specific crop (Quibria 1987). In order to support the low-
income population, food prices are often kept at a low level. To 
compensate for low food prices and to stimulate food production (self-
sufficiency), agricultural inputs (fertilizers) are subsidized (Jeebe, 1996).   
 
2.2.2 Fertilizer subsidies as a means of encouraging new techniques of 
production 
 
It is widely accepted that new agricultural seed-fertilizer technologies are 
associated with high yields, intensive fertilizer application and a large 
yield response to increased fertilizer application. As all new innovations 
are fraught with inertia and uncertainties, so is the agricultural innovation 
of new seed-fertilizer technologies (Quibria 1987). Fertilizer subsidies are 
therefore advocated as a means to circumvent the fear and reluctance of 
the farmers in his switch from traditional to modern technologies. 
However, as the farmers learn more and more about the new technologies, 
they become less and less inhibited; they gradually but finally shift 
completely from traditional to modern technologies. 
The psychological reluctance of the farmers to adopt new technologies can 
be traced to a number of factors. First, lack of information creates a wide 
gap between the farmer`s subjective perception and objective reality with 
regard to the riskiness of the modern techniques of production. Second, 
modern techniques of production are more costly than traditional 
techniques as they involve purchases of new seeds and expensive chemical 
fertilizers (Jeebe, 1996). As capital constraints are widely pervasive in 
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developing countries, temporary subsidies can help ease credit constraints, 
promote the use of new techniques and induce the learning process. 
 
The importance of fertilizer subsidies in promoting higher rates of 
adoption of new technology has been highlighted in a number of recent 
studies. A major implication of all the various models of adoption has 
been to establish the importance of temporary subsidies to overcome the 
problem of fixed costs related to the adoption of the innovation. While this 
emphasizes the role of subsidies to accelerate innovation, the need for 
improving quality of agricultural extension and information services must 
also be simultaneously stressed (Quibria 1987). 
The adoption argument suggests that subsidies should possibly be adopted 
as a temporary measure to induce increasing adoption in those regions 
where adoption is still incomplete. One practical disadvantage of subsidies 
that can be stressed at this point is that subsidies once instituted of being 
difficult to dismantle because of politico-economic reasons. Also difficult 
to implement in practice is distribution of subsidies only to the lagging 
areas to the exclusion of the more advantage region, which may have more 
clout in the political sphere. 
 
2.2.3 Counterbalance risk aversion 
Agriculture is a risky operation and is combined with high uncertainty. 
Assuming that traditional farmers are risk-averse, the use of fertilizer is 
not an optimal solution, as agricultural production in the tropics is highly 
uncertain, risk-averse farmers would be less inclined to make optimal use 
of fertilizer input (under-investment). It may be noted that the optimal 
allocation of resources that obtains in a risk-free, first-best world will not 
materialize in a risky world where farmers are risk-averse. To the extent 
that risk aversion leads to underinvestment and departure from optimal use 
of resources, the government should extend a subsidy to correct the 
situation (Jeebe, 1996). 
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2.2.4 Effects resulting from the use of fertilizer subsidies 
 
The effects from use of fertilizer subsidies can be that farm income will be 
improved, and the gap between the rural and the urban household can be 
decreased. Additional employment can also be created in rural areas, since 
intensification resulting from fertilizer can create more jobs (Jebee 1996). 
 
2.3 Potential impacts on the economic, social, and political environment  
 
It is certainly far too easy to state that fertilizer subsidies have to exist or be 
removed at any cost. For policy makers, it is very important to try to view the 
consequences of subsidy removal and measures, which facilitate such a decision, 
can have.   
In general, the withdrawal of subsidies on chemical fertilizer would, of necessity, 
entail an increase in the price of fertilizer (Jeebe, 1996). This would essentially be 
the outcome because a farmer who maximizes profit would equate marginal value 
product of fertilizer with the price of fertilizer (or the expected utility of the 
marginal value of product of fertilizer with the price of fertilizer) (Quibria 1987). 
Consequently, the farmer will use less fertilizer; the extent of the decline being 
dependent on the elasticity of demand for fertilizer; after the withdrawal of the 
fertilizer subsidy (Quibria 1987). If use of other inputs remains the same, there 
would be a consequent fall in agricultural output. The next question is: how does 
this decline in output affect the price of agricultural output, more particularly rice, 
which is the main staple crop for most developing countries? The answer 
obviously depends on the particular price policy pursued by the government. If the 
government is pursuing an autarkic (no trade) policy, this decline in output would, 
of course be reflected in a higher price and lower availability of output for 
consumption (Quibria 1987). However, autarky is far from the reality of the 
situation, as most countries today are involved in some trade and also price 
involvement in the output market. If the country is committed to maintaining a 
given domestic price level, this reduces domestic output will translate itself into a 
higher import for a deficit country and a reduced supply for exports for the surplus 
country. In other words, the withdrawal of the fertilizer subsidy is likely to cause 
an adverse impact on the balance of payments of the country insofar as it 
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adversely affect the import/export of the agricultural output of the country 
(Quibria 1987).   The withdrawal of the subsidy on fertilizer on the government 
budget is also transparent. In the case where the government withdraws the 
fertilizer subsidy but does not change the price policy with respect to output, there 
could be a reduction in government expenditures on account of fertilizer 
subsidies. However, this implied increase in government saving might be partially 
or totally offset by the extra import of grains, which will be required as output 
supply falls due to the withdrawal of fertilizer subsidies. In the case the country is 
an exporter but not a monopolistic supplier, the government can earn less revenue 
on exports taxes due to a fall in output supply. As regards the effects on rural and 
urban wages, it is very difficult to gauge their impact without further specifying 
the features of the labour market and further those of the wage setting process. 
However, to the extent the withdrawal of the fertilizer subsidy reduces the usage 
of fertilizer; this could bring a fall in the marginal productivity of other 
participating factors of production, including labour. Assuming output prices 
remain the same, and there is no change in the labour supply, with the decrease in 
the rural labour demand both the nominal and the real wage in agriculture could 
tend to decline. If rural wages are slow to adjust or inflexible for any non-
economic reasons, this may, result in higher rural unemployment. The impact on 
the urban industrial wage cannot be traces in any meaningful sense without further 
articulation of the linkages between the rural and the urban sector and the precise 
wage-setting process. With the reduction of subsidies, if the price of agricultural 
output is allowed to rise, this will increase the cost-of-living of urban dwellers 
(Quibria 1987). If the urban wage is nominally fixed or the adjustment is rather 
sluggish, this will decrease the real wage of the urban sector. However, if there is 
a powerful, countervailing trade union, the urban sector might succeed in ensuring 
that the real wage remains unaffected at least in the short run, but that might on 
the other hand exacerbate the urban unemployment rate (Quibria 1987). 
When studying the case in Sri Lanka in 1990, where subsidies were withdrawn, 
fertilizer consumption declined by 15 per cent. Rice production, which had shown 
a considerable upward trend until 1990, decreased by six per cent and recovered 
only very slowly during the following years (Jeebe, 1996). 
 
Impact on the social environment if there was to be a removal of the fertilizer 
subsidy; If the case where that the government withdrew the fertilizer subsidies 
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and also allowed the output prices to adjust in response to market forces, the 
withdrawal in subsidy could lead to a saving of revenue in the government 
coffers. (In many countries, because of either equity reasons or pressures from 
urban consumers, output prices adjustment may not be easily achievable.) 
However, the actual position in a particular country will depend on the features of 
input and output prices prevailing in the country. To either withdraw or maintain 
the fertilizer subsidies satisfactorily, first one needs to specify the welfare 
function. One way to view the dilemma may be to look at the sum of the welfare 
of various segments of the society. A way to classify the various segments of the 
society can be in terms of access to and ownership of productive assets. Another 
way may be in terms of one`s functional role in the society e.g. consumers, 
producers and the government. In light of the preceding discussion, it appears that 
both consumers and producers lose on account of the withdrawal of the fertilizer 
subsidy whereas there is a presumption that the opposite happens in the case of 
the government, as there is a decrease in the expenditure of the government. 
However, as the evidence from any developing countries suggests, the rising food 
price may force the government to pay higher cost-of-living allowances to its 
employees; and consequently, much of the government savings due to decreased 
subsidy may be dissipated by increases in wages and salaries to government 
employees (Quibria 1987).  
To the extent that removal of the fertilizer subsidy has a positive impact on 
government savings, it may help reduce reliance on foreign savings for 
developmental purpose. Taking all this into account, whether there is a net gain in 
welfare depends on whether the losses to the consumers and the producers have 
been more than offset by the net gains accruing to the government. The final 
outcome cannot be predicted without further specification of the empirical 
features of the economy (Quibria 1987).   
 
It is essential to consider elasticity when estimating the total costs of a planned 
subsidy (Samuelson 1983). This equals the subsidy per unit (difference between 
market price and subsidized price) times the new equilibrium quantity. One 
category of goods suffers less from this effect: Public goods are once created in 
ample supply and the total costs of subsidies remain constant regardless of the 
number of consumers; depending on the form of the subsidy, however, the 
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number of producers demanding their share of benefits may still rise and drive 
costs up. 
 
However, subsidies need to be financed, either through additional taxation or 
lending. Whether a country is introducing a subsidy as a social measure or not, 
can only be judged in terms of additional inputs resulting from the subsidy against 
social loss from additional taxation. 
The implications of additional inputs (economical, social and environmental) also 
need to be considered in a macro framework because of the pressure it may exert 
on interest rates and on crowding out of private investment. 
 
2.4 Examples of political and economic impacts of Subsidy policies 
 
Governments all over the world provide subsidies to their industries, to protect 
critical industries against global competition. Therefore a study of fertilizer 
policies in countries such as: Indonesia, Mexico, Malawi and Malaysia, is of most 
relevance for this paper.  
2.4.1 Malaysia 
 
Agriculture has played an important role in the development of modern Malaysia 
and continues to make a significant contribution to the national economy.  
The Malaysian policy for fertilizer imports, which is one of the main inputs in the 
production of crops, is not restricted and has no import licences required. A reason 
for this is manly that the fertilizers can be imported free of tax. Malaysia today 
has no price control of the fertilizer sold domesticity. Therefore the local prices of 
fertilizers are very sensitive to world market prices. The Malayan government 
operated a fertilizer subsidy scheme that was introduced in 1957, because they 
wanted to encourage the use of fertilizers among small farmers and paddy 
farmers. The objective for the subsidy scheme was mainly to help farmers realize 
the advantage of fertilizer use. But in 1971 the subsidy scheme was withdrawn 
because its objective failed and only a third of the area was provided with 
subsidized fertilizer. Instead they introduced a credit scheme in the irrigated 
paddy areas.  
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But in 1974 the government re-introduced the fertilizer subsidy programme for 
paddy farmers. The objective of the scheme was to encourage the optimum use of 
urea and thus prevent any fall in rice production and consequently deterioration in 
the standard of living of the paddy farmers. The subsidy scheme where depended 
on the price for urea if the price where limited to be over US$ 330 per ton.  
The National Farmers Association (NAFAS) in Malaysia is responsible for the 
distribution throughout the country of subsidized fertilizer for paddy farmers and 
for the administration of the subsidy scheme. There are two other aspects for 
withdrawing the fertilizer subsidy scheme; firstly by using a generalized fertilizer 
subsidy is likely to be an inefficient vehicle for raising the income for poor 
farmers. Reasons for this can be the marginal increase in yield through inefficient 
use of fertilizer. And second, there are some instances where paddy farmers have 
been selling their subsidized fertilizers to rubber estates and other smallholders. 
(Talib, 1996) 
 
The Malaysia’s fertilizer sector will continue to rise, in the effort to revitalize 
agriculture and commercialize smallholders’ production. Improving efficiency in 
fertilizer use may be a critical step in reducing the impact of fertilizer prices on 
agricultural production. This can be achieved through improvement in the usage 
of fertilizers, so that the total cost of fertilizer will be declined as a result of higher 
sold quantum of the crops. The fertilizer price can then be applied as an incentive 
that may help improve fertilizer use efficiency. Malaysia's agriculture sector 
needed to be renewed by the government after the economic crisis of 1997, with a 
particular drive to reduce the food importation bill. Meeting the challenge of 
enhanced and more efficient agricultural production was one of the primary 
objectives for increasing the exports and reducing the imports of agricultural 
commodities.   
 
Malaysian politicians are at the present time, debating whether the government 
should continue subsidizing the cost of consumer goods and services, or start 
promoting competition. Second Finance Minister, Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop 
was in 2007 reported by the media stating “that the government is expected to 
spend RM81 billion on all forms of subsidies this year "to help Malaysians cope 
with the rising prices." Prof Ariff replies this by stating, “Instead of subsidizing 
food and other goods, the government should focus on promoting competition. 
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Maintaining that competition is the best antidote for high prices”, he explained 
that once there is competition, producers would strive to keep costs down. If 
production goes up and cost comes down, he said, adding that it is passable to 
consumers in the form of lower prices.  (Ariff 2007) 
2.4.2 Mexico 
 
Like Malaysia, the subsidy policy in Mexico is meant to push the prices down by 
subsidizing products and services. But the Mexican government is also currently 
trying to implement a free market style. The policymakers in Mexico have 
therefore now signed a free trade agreement. 
To predict what will happen if subsidies are removed, there has been conducted a 
significant amount of research on the subjects; one of these is by Doroodian & 
Boyd (1999). They analyzed the impacts on the possible removal of corn subsidy, 
and how this could affect Mexico. The analysis showed that the corn-growing 
sector itself, would not suffer any adverse impact of a subsidy removal.  
The article describes that the politicians in Mexico have had considerable 
discussions regarding the reduction of existing subsidies on corn, even though the 
result of their research suggests that such actions would be relatively painless. 
While it is true that all classes of consumers would be affected and that the 
income changes could be somewhat regressive in nature, this was something that 
could increase government income, which then could be used to correct the 
distortion. These correction payments could for example be targeted to displaced 
workers as well as the working poor that face this opportunity to decrease the rate 
on the existing value-added tax, which also would have an effect of reducing 
economic distortions and improving the allocation of resources. 
 
To implement changes like this over an extended period of time to avoid 
extraordinary gains or losses, care had to be taken, because decrease in the 
subsidy level would lead to a marked increase in saving and consequently have a 
bad effect in the economic investment. But the increase, if it could be maintained 
over a number of years, would positively affect the formation of capital and 
facilitates the type of growth currently favoured by organizations such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  
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2.4.3 Indonesia 
 
The use of mineral fertilizer in Indonesia has had great inputs for the improvement 
of agriculture production. The first fertilizer industry began to bloom in 1963, 
when the first fertilizer plants were constructed. Indonesia has had for a long time, 
and continues today to have a major focus on the increased production of rice; 
Indonesia is the 3rd largest country in the world of production of rice. Indonesia 
has had significant success in expanding its rice production; this is a result of the 
combination of output and input price policy that have improved the profitability 
of rise cultivation. 
Rice production doubled from 1970s from 20 million tonnes, to 51 million tons in 
2002. This came as an effect from the remarkable increase in fertilizer use.  The 
numbers of annual fertilizer use has increased from 635 to 5 931 thousand tons in 
30 years, (www.fao.com 2005) as shown in the table below.  
 
Development of the planted area, production and yield of lowland rice 
 
Year Planted area 
('000 ha) 
Production 
('000 tonnes) 
Yield 
(tones/ha) 
1960 6 567 14 302 2.18 
1975 8 532 23 443 2.75 
1990 10 502 45 179 4.30 
1998 10 681 46 291 4.33 
1999 11 963 50 870 4.25 
2000 11 794 51 900 4.41 
2001 11 500 50 461 4.39 
2002 11 521 51 490 4.47 
   Source: IFPA, 2004. 
 
The Government of Indonesia used the fertilizers subsidy as an important 
instrument for managing fertilizer marketing and distribution. The domestic prices 
of fertilizer were lower than the world prices, on account of the subsidy. The 
outcome of the past policies of subsidizing domestic fertilizer prices became a 
heavily budgetary burden for Indonesia, because of inefficient use of fertilizers by 
the farmers. Relatively low domestic fertilizing prices also resulted in fertilizing 
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smuggling. To reduce the budgetary burden and improve the efficiency of 
fertilizer use, the government had to increase the retail price.  
The removal of the subsidy on fertilizers from farmers has been considered as one 
of the most controversial policy issues in Indonesia’s rural development today.  
(Firdausy 1997) 
The heavily budgetary burden for Indonesia was also enhanced because most 
farmers were and are still living in poverty conditions. The removal of fertilizer 
subsidy contributes to increasing the incidence of poverty and income inequality, 
at least in the villages surveyed. Therefore, economic strategies such as a removal 
of fertilizer subsidy should be carefully implemented on a selective basis, 
especially to rural areas where economic infrastructure conducive to competition 
is still limited. 
The most important factor for increasing fertilizer demand is the improvement in 
the profitability of its use. Other problems to include are low fertilizer quality, an 
inadequate choice of fertilizer types and inadequate access to credit, especially for 
smallholders. During the economic crisis, there was deterioration also in other 
farming practices. 
 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(www.fao.org), the best way to achieve efficient fertilization, the supply of 
fertilizers should be: 
• Of the required type.  
• In adequate amounts.  
• Of guaranteed quality  
• Available at the place required, village or farm level.  
• Available at the time required, well before the peak-planting season.  
• At an affordable price.  
 
Asia Pulse (2007), states that Indonesia is going to cut its fertilizers subsidy for 
the year 2008.The government is planning to cut its urea and SP-36 fertilizer 
subsidy and raise subsidized NPK (nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium known as 
N-P-K, which is the better mix that will give the farmers better soil and growth) 
fertilizer production following an upward trend in the global fertilizer prices. The 
increase in the global prices of urea fertilizer and non-urea fertilizer such as SP-
Yara International ASA                                                       24.04.2008 
Page 16 
36, KCL and ZA would have a direct impact on the amount of subsidy the 
government would allocate. 
A proposal for a fertilizer subsidy of Rp7.5 trillion (US$795 million) in 2008, of 
which Rp6.7 trillion would go to state-owned fertilizer companies assigned to 
produce subsidized fertilizer. With the increase in global fertilizer prices, the 
amount of fertilizer subsidy would increase in 2008 if the volume of subsidized 
fertilizer were the same as in 2007. The Agriculture Minister Anton Apriyantono 
made this statement regarding the proposal:  
"We will make optimum use of the existing subsidy. To make it sufficient, we 
will encourage the use of NPK and organic fertilizer”.  
The government therefore decided to reduce the amount of subsidy for urea and 
SP-36 fertilizer whose price had almost doubled in the past few months. The 
global urea fertilizer price was US$210 per ton at the start of 2007 and climbed to 
US$350-400 per ton at the end of this year. The prices of non-urea fertilizer such 
as SP-36 doubled to US$300 per ton from US$150 per ton. (Asia Pulse 2007) 
This article was published in December 2007, and a solution has been made. An 
article from 2008 has confirms that the government has now allocated Rp8.7 
trillion (US$922.2 million) this year for the procurement of subsidized fertilizers 
and direct assistance for food crop growers across Indonesia (Asian Pulse 2008).     
2.4.4 Malawi 
 
A study conducted by Fisher and Shively (2007) has shown the environmental 
impact of the Starter Pack Scheme (SPS) in Malawi. The SPS consists of a free-
inputs program aimed at promoting agricultural intensification. Increasingly, 
agricultural intensification interventions have dual purposes of agricultural 
development and environmental conservation. Their studies contain the impacts of 
the subsidy program on forest pressure in Malawi (Fisher & Shively 2007).   
 
The study focuses on two distinct sources of forest degradation: forest clearing for 
agricultural expansion and forest product extraction for commercialization. 
Receipt of a free packet of hybrid maize seed and fertilizer (a "starter pack") had 
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no measurable effect on the forest clearing decision. In other words, inputs appear 
to have led to intensification of existing farmland, rather than area expansion. 
Results also show that households receiving a starter pack had lower levels of 
commercial forest product extraction than their cohorts who did not receive free 
inputs, all else equal. In tandem, findings suggest that the SPS may have had a 
small but beneficial impact on forests. A starter pack made a household's labour 
relatively more valuable in farming, leading to a reallocation of effort away from 
forest degrading activities. Alongside evaluation studies that document positive 
impacts of the SPS on agricultural output and food security, these findings 
indicate possible agriculture-environment complementarities in Malawi. 
 
These are just a few examples of subsidies existing in the world today. Following 
is a list that displays the average subsidies expenditures that governments had in 
1998 - 2002. 
 
The WTO calculated subsidies as a percentage of government expenditures using 
data from OECO (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 
the period between 1998 and 2002 (Abboushi 2007).  
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Chapter 3 - Research methodology 
 
The Research process 
 
(Bush, 2007) 
 
Step 1 - Establish the need for research  
Yara International ASA wants to succeed in India. But they are now in a position 
where they need to decide whether or not they should continue their operations in 
India. The reasoning for this is that the fertilizer subsidy policy that exists at the 
present time, are not enabling them to get the profit wanted. Yara International 
ASA therefore wanted a research on the subject, in order to predict the Indian 
fertilizer subsidy policies and its potential changes for the future. 
 
Step 2 - Define the problem 
The problem definition was first made by Mr. Terje Knutsen in Yara International 
ASA`s division in Singapore. But through a process of discussion together with 
Mr. Knutsen and our supervisor Dr. Sunanda Sangwan we agreed on a problem 
definition that was manageable for us. This lead to the following problem 
definition: 
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“How does the Indian fertilizer subsidy policy regime influence the Indian 
environment, and will there be any changes in the fertilizer subsidy policy in the 
future?” 
 
Step 3 - Establish research objectives 
To gather the necessary information to solve our problem definition, we had to 
establish research objectives. These objectives are what we will be answering 
throughout our assignment.  
 
Why subsidies are needed in the first place? What affects the fertilizing subsidies 
has on the farmers and producers? How do other countries subsidize agriculture 
and what affects have there been when withdrawing the fertilizer subsidies? What 
is the context of fertilizer subsidies in India? What impacts the fertilizer subsidy 
policy has on India, at a Macro level? Are there any differences in the opinions 
surrounding fertilizing policies within the Indian political environment? 
 
If these objectives are achieved we would be more capable to answer our problem 
definition in step 2.  
 
Step 4 - Determine research design 
In order to answer our objectives we used exploratory research with a case study 
method. Exploratory research is a design used to collect information in an 
unstructured and informal manner, to provide us with a broader understanding of 
the Indian fertilizer subsidy policy.  
 
Step 5 - Identify information types and sources 
 Primary Data 
To obtain primary data, we contacted the Indian embassy and the SICCI in 
Singapore, in hope of them providing us with information regarding our 
objectives. Unfortunately we were not able to get response from proper 
authorities. They where however able to provide us with information on how to 
get in contact with, The Minister of Chemicals and Fertilizers in India, but we 
were not able to acquire any response from him. This shortened our options to 
gain primary data of the current situation in India.  
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Secondary Data 
For this assignment we used secondary data. Our data was collected from 
secondary data from the library and from academic sources, such as journals, 
books and reports. To compensate the loss of primary data, we gathered several 
news articles, which included the opinions of relevant authorities.   
 
Step 6 - Determine methods of accessing data 
To access data needed we relied basically on two methods, these were the library 
and the Internet. Through the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) library 
we were able to get in hold of academic books with references to our research. 
The NTU library is also accessible on the Internet where several refereed 
academic journals are available. In order to access more data, we also used 
publications from the National Library of Singapore.  
 
Step 7 & 8 – Design data collection forms & Determine sample Size 
Since we were not able to collect the primary data needed, these steps were not of 
any relevance for us. 
 
Step 9 - Collect data 
We collected data from various databases at the NTU library website. The 
collection of articles and literature books we used, were to understand the subsidy 
policy on fertilizers and why subsidies are needed. Further to understand the 
situation in India and to solve our problem definition of predicting the fertilizer 
subsidy policies. 
 
Step 10 - Analyze data 
We analyzed all the data we found of relevance for our research. We used the 
PESTEL framework, first to understand the background and the current conditions 
in India and further to understand the future in India. Our findings is summed up 
in a current SWOT analysis of India, were we list India’s strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and possible threats. 
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Further we analyzed the fertilizer market in India by using Porter’s five forces 
model. This was done in order to strengthening our recommendations towards 
whether or not Yara International ASA should continue with their current 
operations.  
 
Step 11 – Prepare and present the final research report 
The deadline for the written report is on the 24th of April. The research findings 
and recommendations will be presented at NTU on the 6th of May. 
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Chapter 4 - Case study: India’s Fertilizer subsidies 
 
This chapter investigate India’s fertilizer subsidy policy in depth, using data from 
secondary sources. Our objective is to understand the existence of fertilizer 
subsidies in India from various perspectives, and try to revile any possible 
changes in the fertilizer subsidies. 
 
4.1 Fertilising subsidies in India 
 
The fertilizer subsidies policy in India, have developed over time as a result of 
starvation and unproductiveness in the fertilizing sector. In the early 1970s, the 
effectiveness in the fertilizing sector was so low, that the land they tilled where 
not delivering the revenue that the farmers needed to survive. This led to a 
massive growth in rural movement to the urban areas, so farmers could find work 
with better revenue to survive. The government and the farmers saw this happen, 
so, as a result, the farmers convinced the government to give fertilizer subsidies to 
stabilize the rural migration and to get a higher growth potential in the land the 
farmers tilled.  
 
At present, the fertilizer subsidies, counts for the second highest, subsidized sector 
in India (Appendix 2). In particular, subsidies on power and fertilizer, has now 
proved to be a heavy burden on India’s budget. Its beneficiaries are both the rich 
and the poor farmers, but the richer farmers are by far the bigger beneficiaries. 
This is because of the payment mechanism, that subsidies are paid directly to the 
producer of power and fertilizer rather than to the end-user. Hence, the larger the 
user of these inputs, the bigger the benefit. 
 
By the year 2002, subsidies were to meet the cost of power supplied to rural areas 
were 1.1 percent of GDP, and subsidies for the cost of fertilizers were another 0.5 
percent (Dossani 2008). On average, agriculturists today pay about a half cent per 
kilowatt hour of power, or less than a tenth of the real cost of power. For many 
states with large rural populations, such as Andhra Pradesh, rural subsidies for 
power and fertilizer account for more than a third of the states` budgets, leaving 
too little to support rural education and health services (Dossani 2008). 
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As the rich farmers have captured the most fertile land (and the benefits of 
subsidies), poorer farmers have been forced to the tilling of smaller lots and 
poorer-quality land. This has created a perverse situation: While rich farmers have 
used their clouts to ensure that subsidized inputs will continue (but just a few will 
survive if subsidies were reduced), the subsidies are crucial to the survival of the 
poor farmer. Urban analyst has long bemoaned the fact that the political power of 
rich farmers is stalling more rational pricing. This is true, but, if prices are raised, 
the poorer farmers will starve (Dossani 2008) 
 
A solution to this problem could be to provide bigger subsidies to poor farmers 
than to rich ones. Unfortunately, this would require a change in how subsidies 
today are delivered, because fertilizer subsidies are being paid directly to the 
producer. This will have to change if subsidies are to benefit farmers with low 
incomes.  
 
The poor farmers have to be identified. How will one do so, given that 
agriculturists are not required to pay taxes and keep no records of their income? 
So, even if politically possible, which is itself unlikely, it will be a far messier 
with significantly more room for corrupt practice than the current system (Dossani 
2008). 
 
4.1.1 Social cultural factors for fertilizing subsidies in India 
 
Bangalore 2008 and Dossani 2008 did a survey of land usage of more than 400 
fertilizer farmers in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh in 2000. They found that 
on average, the revenue farmers earned from the land was so inadequate that, had 
they been asked to pay the true cost of power and fertilizers, these costs would 
exceed their revenue. The bleak fact was that, for the average farmer, the land 
they tilled was so unproductive that they could not afford to pay the full price of 
inputs. It was also found that the average annual revenue per acres was Rs.2, 300 
($50). For the average farmer with eight acres of land, the annual revenue was Rs 
18,400 ($400) (Dossani 2008).  The findings of the report clearly indicate that the 
need for fertilizer subsidies is still very vital for the farmers, and any removal of 
the subsidies would lead to starvation and bankruptcy for most farmers. 
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For the typical rural household of 5.5 persons, Rs. 18,400 is the equivalent of less 
than 25 U.S cents of revenue per person per day (note that this is revenue, not 
income) against this revenue, the farmer had to pay for fertilizer, seeds, and power 
which accounted for 30 percent of his revenue. For the average farmer, the true 
cost of electricity (not the subsidized cost, which, as noted, was below 10 percent 
of the real cost) alone was Rs.21, 000, that is, more than his income (Dossani 
2008).  
 
In India, the wealthiest 20 percent of fertilizer farmers are only earning revenue 
that would allow them to pay up to 1 cent per kilowatt-hour, or about a fifth of the 
true cost. None would be able to afford the real cost of power, which was about 
5.5 cents per kilowatt-hour. In other words, if the government was to remove the 
subsidies, even the rich farmers would then no longer be rich, and the poor 
farmers would be much worse off (Dossani 2008). 
 
This shows that even the twenty percent of the wealthiest farmers are so reliant of 
the subsidies that they cannot afford to continue production, if the subsidies where 
to be removed. If the wealthiest farmers cannot even afford to buy their own 
power without subsidies, one might ask if they are able then to buy the best 
fertilizers without these fertilizing products being subsidized.  
 
4.1.2 A better policy than fertilizers subsidies for the Indian environment 
 
A better policy than just subsidizing the fertilizer producer would have been to 
spend more on rural health and education. This is also a fact that India, to some 
extent has now realized, but the information technologies on health and education, 
still have a long way to go. This might, slowly, create the capacity for more 
productive rural activity, including rural industry, which also is an opportunity for 
Yara International ASA because the farmers would then have the ability to gather 
information amongst different fertilizer products, which again, could lead to a 
more profound knowledge about Yara International ASA products. But still there 
is the fact that farmers today cannot afford these fertilizers without subsidies, a 
possibility though, is that they by the new knowledge provided can influence the 
subsidy policy that are in India today.  
Yara International ASA                                                       24.04.2008 
Page 25 
 
Current subsidy policy has led to an impossible social situation where the 
reduction of subsidies will lead to widespread bankruptcy (although this is not the 
right term, because the poor are not bankable), and so cannot be done (Dossani 
2008). This is also reflected when reading the regular and disheartening news 
reports of farmers resorting to suicide whenever the states raised the price of 
subsidized inputs suddenly became explicable. These farmers were so poor that 
they existed only because of the subsidy. It would be cheaper for the state to force 
them to stop farming and receive a subsidy that fully compensated them for the 
loss of income. And there is no respite: In 2006, on average, four farmers 
committed suicide every day (Dossani 2008).  
 
4.1.3 The power of the rural elite 
 
Since 1991, the rural elite have in later years become a powerful force, and is now 
supported by all the political parties, with the only exception of the Communist 
parties. In some future era, it will take a leader with the charisma of Mrs. Gandhi, 
the sincerity of Nehru, and a party with a deep interest in the rural poor to reduce 
the power of the rural elite. As said by Dossani (Dossani 2008) “No such 
combination appears likely to emerge from the current set of parties, all of which 
have other, largely urban, agendas”.  
 
4.2 Political and economical factors 
 
India is a parliamentary federal democracy with an indirectly elected president, 
currently Abdul Kalam. The Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, leads the United  
Progressive Alliance (UPA), a coalition dominated by the Congress party, which 
fell short of a majority in the May 2004 general election. The minority UPA 
government; is currently being supported by the Left Front, a group of left-wing 
parties dominated by the Communist Party of India (E.I.U 2007)  
 
4.2.1 Possible Political obstacles to changes in fertilizer subsidy 
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As the elections in 1996 resulted in what can be considered as a hung parliament, 
lasting for just thirteen days (E.I.U 2007), the need for a stronger governmental 
ruling in India was needed. The Hindu- nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
formed in 1998 a governing coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), 
with twenty-two other parties under the leadership of Atal Behari Vajpayee (E.I.U 
2007) In April 1999 the NDA government collapsed after narrowly losing a vote 
of confidence. It remained as a caretaker administration for six months before re-
establishing itself in power following a general election held in September- 
October 1999. The alliance of more than twenty parties included a number of 
smaller regional and caste-based parties, which exercised disproportionate 
influence in government, often holding the administration to ransom in order gain 
concessions in their home states (E.I.U 2007). Today the ruling government, 
UPA, consist of fourteen parties and is supported by the Left Parties. (pmindia 
2004)  Coalition governance has become a continuing feature of Indian politics at 
the federal level and increasingly also at the state level, since 1996. On both levels 
it seems that coalition governments have found it hard to push through policies, 
particularly those requiring legislative action (E.I.U 2007). This might make any 
changes in the fertilizer subsidies policies, a long and slowly process, due to the 
many different standpoints from the respected parties of the government today. 
Even if there is to become a change in government at the May election in 2009, 
which is most likely, the new ruling government will in all likelihood also consist 
of coalition between several parties.  
Another possible hinder to any change in the fertilizing subsidies could also come 
from the left side, mainly from the communist parties, whom gains supports from 
the farmers and fertilizer producers.  
  
4.2.2 Left parties could threaten the liberation of the fertilizer subsidy           
policy  
 
The government faces no immediate threat to its survival and looks on course to 
last a full five-year term until 2009. However, it is severely hampered in its ability 
to formulate and implement policy. Politics remains centred more on tensions 
within the UPA coalition and between the UPA and its notional allies, than on 
competition from the BJP. The main tension is between the reformist economic 
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liberalism of several leading Congress figures, notably Mr Singh and the finance 
minister, P Chidambaram, and the leftist populism of many government 
supporters. These include members of Congress and of its coalition partners, and 
in particular the communist parties, which are not in the UPA but which lend 
parliamentary support to it. Curiously, the largest, the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), or CPI (M), has come to resemble the official opposition (E.I.U 2007). 
It has so far stood in the way of economic liberalisation ranging from opening up 
India’s vast retail sector to fast-tracking industrial development through the 
creation of special economic zones (E.I.U 2007), which could delay any 
economical liberalisation in the way that fertilizer subsidies are given. The party's 
strategy appears to be to use the leverage it now enjoys to expand its influence 
beyond those states where it is already a major forces, such as West Bengal, 
Tripura and Keralaóto, to the rest of India. To do this, it is relying on its 
supporters in the trade unions. This means that it has tried to block any reform 
seen as damaging to the interests of the workforce in the "organised" sectors, 
definition covering workplaces with more than ten employees. There are about 30 
millions such workers out of a total labour force of more than 400 millions, but 
they have become disproportionately powerful (E.I.U 2007). At the present time it 
is the fertilizer producers, the “organised” sectors in India, whom are receiving the 
fertilizing subsidies, and not the farmers. Given that the CPI will continue to gain 
support from the workforce in the “organised” sectors, any change in how the 
fertilizer subsidies are given, seems to be distant. Reasoning for why the left are 
also gaining support from the farmers is described by Figure 1 a. 
Figure 1 a 
 
When the government gives a subsidy, producers (fertilizer producers) as well as 
consumers (farmers) are the ones who are positively affected. (See details in 
Appendix 1) 
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4.2.3 Fertilizing subsidies, an economical burden? 
 
Even though the subsidies given by the government benefits the farmers and 
fertilizer producers in India, it does not benefit the population as a whole. This is 
reasoned by the fact that when subsidies are given, it creates a deadweight loss in 
the free market equilibrium,  
Figure 1 b 
 
which is a loss of economic efficiency in a market; the ones who are affected by 
the loss are the taxpayers that are not benefiting from the subsidy. The pressure 
for better usage of the fertilizer subsidies could then come from the thirty million 
taxpayers in India (Jagtiani, 2006). Though it must be emphasized that taxpayers 
only stand for roughly 3% of the total population in India today, and are such not 
substantial in the total amount of electors. If the change to the fertilizer subsidies 
would be based on a democratic voting, and in such, the taxpayers alone would 
most likely not be able to influence any political outcome. But the facts still 
remain, for every Rs. billion the Indian government spends on fertilizer subsidy, a 
significantly amount of taxpayers’ money is lost. Given that it is reasonable to 
presume that an amount of the taxpayers today have more influence than just their 
vote, due to their positions in both the business landscape as well as the political 
landscape, they could influence the ruling government to make better use of their 
tax money, and in such refine the way fertilizer subsidies are given at the present 
time. 
Another argument towards the economical inefficiency use of fertilizing subsidies 
are made by Ashok Gulati, the director of Asia International Food Policy 
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Research Institute (IFPRI), whom states that the government has so far disbursed 
Rs37, 451 crore as fertilizer subsidy for the year 2007-08 as against a budget 
allocation of Rs22, 451 crore. He concludes with that today India is paying out 
huge amounts in subsidy without a single unit of increase in productivity (MINT 
2008) (Appendix 3). Given this statement and the deadweight loss India today 
has, it is clear that the fertilizing subsidy policy is becoming a major economical 
cost and burden for India. How long can India withstand this burden? 
 
4.2.4 Political arguments towards a change in fertilizer subsidy 
 
There are today speculations towards a change in the subsidy policy, these 
speculations were strengthened after agricultural experts whom recently met with 
Finance Minister P. Chidambaram, they argued for a more direct subsidy regime 
(MINT 2008). The bases for this argument are that; if farmers were to collect the 
subsidies directly, they would be more able to buy the fertilizer that was 
customized to their soil’ requirement, the argument was also supported by Mr. 
Chidambaram whom stated: “While fertilizers should indeed be subsidized, we 
must find an alternative method of delivering the subsidy directly to the farmer” 
(The Hindu 2007). Even though the Prime Minister sees the need to empower the 
farmers by giving them the opportunity, through direct subsidy, to select the best 
suited fertilizer for their specific soil, he rejected together with the Group of 
Ministers, which consists of minister P. Chidambaram, minister of Chemicals and 
Fertilizers, Ram Vilas Paswan and Planning commission deputy chairman, 
Montek Singh Ahluwalia, a proposal to provide direct subsidies to farmers in 
favour of the existing system of indirect subsidy payments (MINT 2007). 
Reasoning for this are the difficulties there is to implement new policies in such a 
huge and diversely country. Having that said, there are at the present time many 
forces that are suggesting a change in the way that the fertilizing subsidies policies 
are given. Even the fertilizer producers, whom are benefiting from today’s policy, 
see the need for change. And a senior executive at a fertilizer firma who did not 
wish to be identified, said “The present subsidy system is damaging the soil and 
harming the farmer as well” (MINT 2007). 
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4.2.5 Corruption interfering new policymaking 
 
India is the world's most populous democracy and has held regular and largely 
free elections since 1947. For members of parliament, the chances of re-election 
to the Lok Sabha are low because anti-incumbency is a key trend in Indian 
politics, the members therefore tend to maximise their personal gains rather than 
working for the welfare of their electorate (E.I.U 2007). The Election Commission 
of India (ECI) has wide powers to requisition the government machinery for 
elections and has ensured fairly orderly elections; in 2003 it won the right to make 
candidates disclose criminal records. However, there are occasional cases of poll 
rigging and intimidation; spending limits on candidates are poorly enforced and 
candidates with criminal records are often elected, particularly to the state 
assemblies. In the May 2007 Uttar Pradesh state assembly polls, one-third of all 
candidates had a criminal record. Generally, a high level of political awareness 
and the sheer size of the electorate nevertheless ensure that the final results reflect 
the wishes of the people, and the ousting of incumbent administrations has 
become increasingly frequent (E.I.U 2007). 
 
Even though the results reflect the wishes of the people, a reflection is not 
considered to be a 100% reproduction of that what is reflected. Therefore it is 
arguable whether or not the opposition of the fertilizing subsidies policies today, 
are given their right to influence any future change in the matter.  Having that in 
mind, it is most likely that the right given to the ECI will have most positively 
affected towards elections in the future. Hopefully the corruption landscape in 
India’s politics will vanish in the future as an effect ECI surveillance, and 
politicians will be obliged to focus on the welfare of their electorates, rather than 
maximizing their own personal gains.  
 
This could be of interest to Yara International ASA, seeing that the need for better 
fertilizers will become more and more crucial for the agricultural growth in India, 
as well as the rest of the world. The local and state politicians would then be 
compelled to focus on the best fertilizer products worldwide as well as in India, 
rather than just the best fertilizer products produced in their domestic area. This 
could then lead to a change in the way that fertilizing subsidies are granted today. 
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4.2.6 Could we expect any changes in the subsidy policy before the 
upcoming election? 
 
With just over a year of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition 
government five-year term remaining, India’s political parties are gearing up for a 
parliamentary election, which will be held by May 2009. State elections are due in 
ten states before then. Congress should now be seen to be delivering on its 
promise of more equitable economic growth, as otherwise its prospects in the 
general election will be poor in spite of the record rates of economic growth that 
India has enjoyed under its stewardship. The agricultural sector, which is the 
country’s largest employer, remains in distress despite large-scale government-
sponsored programs targeting the rural sector (E.I.U 2007).  
 
Attention was therefore on the budget for fiscal year 2008/09 (April-March), 
presented on February 29th. The budget, the UPA’s last, was expected to channel 
as much money as possible into the agricultural sector and education (E.I.U 2007). 
On February 29th India's finance minister, P Chidambaram, presented his United 
Progressive Alliance government's budget for the 2008/09 fiscal year (April-
March). The Congress-led government, which is supported by the Left Front 
parties, believes it was elected in 2004 with a mandate to focus more on social 
issues. The government is also preparing for general elections by May 2009. It 
was no surprise, then, that the Rs7.5trn (US$187bn) budget played to the galleries, 
with heavy allocations for the rural economy and social sectors such as education 
and health, as well as income-tax concessions to gladden the middle class. Seeing 
the UPA`s need to please electors in the rural areas, any change that could be seen 
as harmful towards the rural economy, such as a sudden change in the way that 
fertilizers are given, would not be expected before the election in May 2009.  
4.2.7 Strengthening the rural economy 
 
The budget's big focus was on India's rural economy, which accounts for almost 
70% of its 1.1bn people. According to government estimates, India's GDP grew at 
an impressive 9.6% in 2006/07 and is likely to clock an 8.7% rate in the current 
fiscal year, driven by services and manufacturing growth. But with agricultural 
growth rates slowing and rural indebtedness an increasing worry, the government 
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is concerned that the economic boom of recent years has left out large sections of 
the population. Therefore, in the single largest hand-out in Indian history, the 
budget promised to waive the outstanding debts of some 40 millions small 
farmers, worth Rs600bn. Agricultural loans given by banks and co-operative 
credit institutions up to March 31st 2007, and overdue as of December 31st 2007, 
are eligible. Farmers with land up to two hectares will have their debts completely 
waived, while the rest will participate in a one-time settlement scheme that will 
waive 25% of their debt (E.I.U 2007). 
This will have a substantial effect on the farmer’s economy, at least in the short 
run. The interesting question is whether or not the deletion of the farmer’s debt, 
will encourage farmer’s to invest more capital to better strengthening their 
agricultural growth and efficiency, and in such have an effect in the long run. If 
this would be the outcome, which is reasonable to presume, their investments 
could then lead to a higher income, and as a consequence of this, be more 
acceptable towards investing in better and more expensive fertilizers.  
4.3 Technological factors 
 
Can Technology minimize the fertilizer subsidies? 
To answer this question, we could take a look at the processing technology that 
exists within the fertilizing sector today and the information technology that are 
available to the farmers within the fertilizing sector. Since the farmers in India at 
present time are very poor and a sustainable amount of the farmers cannot afford 
investing in new technology to better process their land, measures by the 
government should be done. If the government of India could make this possible, 
a result could be that, instead of subsidies the fertilizer sector as much as they do 
today, they could rather invested in technology. As for today, the government of 
India has deleted the farmer’s debt and we can conclude that India is taking the 
problem of poor farmers serious. The deletion of the farmer’s debt can also be an 
opportunity for Yara International ASA, since the farmers could be better suited to 
invest in new technology. It is also important that India`s information technology 
is sustainable enough to keep the farmers updated in form of agricultural 
innovations and fertilizers products that can help them get a higher return and 
growth from their crops. As a conclusion for the technology, the farmers now 
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have the opportunity to invest in new technology, but might not have the 
information needed to know what to invest in. 
4.4 Legal factors 
  
Studying the legal environment in India, with focus on the legal regulation that is 
most important for fertilizer manufactures, the FCO was declared as an Essential 
Commodity and Fertilizer Control Order (FCO) and are promulgated under 
Section 3 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955, to regulate, trade, price, quality 
and distribution of fertilizers in the country. This is to ensure adequate availability 
of right quality of fertilizers at right time and at right price to farmers.  
The FCO provides for compulsory registration of fertilizer manufacturers, 
importers and dealers, specification of all fertilizers manufactured/imported and 
sold in the country, regulation on manufacture of fertilizer mixtures, packing and 
marking on the fertilizer bags, appointment of enforcement agencies, setting up of 
quality control laboratories and prohibition on manufacture/import and sale of 
non-standard/spurious/adulterated fertilizers. Accordingly there are 67 Fertilizer 
Quality Control Laboratories in India, which includes 4 set up by Central 
Government as CFQC&TI, Faridabad and its three Regional Laboratories. The 
order also provides for cancellation of authorization letter/registration certificates 
of dealers and mixture manufacturers and also imprisonment from 3 months to 7 
years with fine to offenders under ECA.  The FCO offence has also been declared 
as knowable and non-bail able. (Dacnet, 2007) 
In conclusions, the FCO has very strict rules, which makes importing any new 
fertilizing products a hard and time consuming process. See paragraph below: 
 
§ 29A. Qualifications for appointment of fertilizer analyst in the ferti1ser 
control laboratories 
Training in fertilizer quality control and analysis at Central Fertilizer 
Quality Control and Training Institute, Faridabad. 
Provided that the fertilizer analysts appointed before the commencement 
of this Order, who do not possess the requisite training, shall undergo 
prescribed training, within a period of three years, in the Central 
Fertilizer Quality Control " and Training Institute, Faridabad from the 
date of commencement of this Order. (FCO, 1985) 
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4.5 Environmental factors 
 
The environmental issues for fertilizer manufactures in India, is that the fertilizer 
sector (the farmers) are dependent on the monsoon to get a positive result of their 
production. As the monsoon shift from year to year and also affects the farmers 
economy as well as India’s GDP (Bhattacharya & Kar 2006) it will also most 
likely affect fertilizer manufactures revenue and demand. The infrastructure 
especially in the rural sector India is at present very poor; this includes 
telecommunication, roads, irrigation, water supply and electricity. But now a plan 
for developing rural India has been made, were a budget of USD 40 Billion has 
been set up (Appendix 4). In conclusion, India seems to understand their 
weakness in infrastructure, and is spending a huge amount of their budget to build 
up their infrastructure, but the farmers, are still relying on the monsoon in order to 
grow their crops and achieve profit. Given that there is a good monsoon year, this 
will enable them to invest in innovative fertilizer products.    
4.6 SWOT - analysis of India’s fertiliser policy 
 
To summarize our PESTEL, we have listed India’s strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats regarding the surroundings of current subsidy polices on 
fertilizers.   
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Weaknesses 
- GDP is heavily dependent on the 
monsoon, which means that they need to 
invest further on resources to get a 
sustainable growth in their GDP 
- Political processes are time consuming. 
Collation makes it difficult for 
governments to implement new policies 
- Significant deadweight-loss in their 
usage of the subsidies 
- The present fertilizer subsidy policy is 
not efficient in terms of agricultural 
growth 
- High rate of poverty 
- Poor infrastructure nationwide   
 
Strengths 
 
- India seems to take their environmental 
issues serious, and is spending a great 
amount of their budget to build up their 
infrastructure in the rural areas (Roads, 
telecommunication, water-supply, 
house-holdings) 
- India has a steady growth in their GDP 
(2006= 9.4%, 2007= 8.4%) 
- Focus on removing corruption 
 
Opportunities 
- India has a large budget and a high GDP 
growth. This could lead to investment in 
innovation technology to support the 
rural areas 
- - Investing in new technology may give 
more job opportunities for the labour-
poor-work force  
- Process more of their raw material 
themselves 
- Direct subsidy policies. Let the subsidies 
go straight to the farmer 
- Subsidy of better fertilizers mixes 
- A better foreign direct investment 
strategy. Do not make it so difficult and 
time-consuming to enter the Indian 
Market 
- Further growth in the rural area 
Threats 
- Monsoon Æ Climate change Æ Global 
warming 
- World prices on fertilizer  
- 70% of the Indian labour force is 
farmers, which means that they are 
heavily dependent on the outcome of the 
crops  
- Direct subsides can fail because it’s 
difficult to implement  
 
 
 
 
Yara International ASA                                                       24.04.2008 
Page 36 
4.7 Michael Porter’s Five Forces Analysis 
 
Porter's 5 forces analysis is a framework for the industry analysis and business 
strategy development developed by Michael E. Porter of Harvard Business School 
in 1979. It uses concepts developed in Industrial Organization (IO) economics to 
derive 5 forces that determine the competitive intensity and therefore 
attractiveness of a market. Porter referred to these forces as the microenvironment, 
to contrast it with the more general term macro environment. They consist of 
those forces close to a company that affect its ability to serve its customers and 
make a profit. A change in any of the forces normally requires a company to re-
assess the marketplace. (Porter, 1979) (Appendix 5) 
 
We used Porter’s framework to develop the five forces to determine the 
attractiveness of the fertilizer market in India. Through our case study we have 
focused on answering Yara International ASA´s question, regarding if there is to 
become any future changes to fertilizing policy in India. We will therefore not 
analyze the fertilizing market as deeply as if we were to make a marketing 
strategy for Yara International ASA.   
 
Buyer Power  
There is low product differentiation among the producers in India since the Indian 
government is just subsidizing the basic chemicals, and therefore buyers at the 
present time have some power towards the subsidised fertilizer producers. But 
buyers are low in their power to buy fertilizer that are not subsidised.   
  
Supplier Power  
The supplier power is high because the Indian industry relies heavily on import 
for its requirements of raw materials. (Equity Master 2005) 
The supplier is often the main driver of what the producers production cost will 
be, and therefore also a main driver of the end price.  
 
Intensity of Competition 
There is an increasing competition amongst international companies in India at the 
present time. Attached in Appendix 6 there is a list of the seven largest companies 
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that are operating India at the present time and their performance on the stock 
exchange-market. 
Seeing that the fertilizer market in India is of significant size, the intensity among 
international rivalry is at the present low, this is also strengthened by the fact that 
India is still covering their demand of fertilizers by importing.  
 
Threat of New Entrants  
The Indian agriculture-industry has a growing demand for fertilizers, and 
therefore threats of new entrants can be considered as high.  
The legal factors for introducing new chemical products to the Indian fertilizer 
market can make any new entrance for fertilizer producers a slow and costly 
process. These two factors combined make the total threat of new entrant’s 
medium high.      
 
Threat of Substitute Products  
Pro-biotic Fertilizers (Appendix 7), which is a substitute for chemical fertilizers is 
on its way up. But this product is expensive and could just appeal to the richer 
farmers. Therefore the threat of Substitute can be higher in the long run given that 
the farmer’s economy will rise. However, at the present farmers are poor and the 
pro-biotic fertilizers are not subsidized.  Hence the threat is low.  
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Chapter 5 – Recommendations and Conclusion 
Recommendations based on our PESTEL and Porter 
Through our research we have gone more in-depth in the fertilizer subsidy 
situation in India and its surrounding impacts. And it seems to be clear that there 
will be no cut in the fertilizers subsidies in the short run. This is reasoned by any 
removal or a reduction of the subsidies in India would lead to a crisis in the rural 
sector, since most farmer’s are at the present time living in poverty. 
 
Removal not an option 
Therefore any removal of fertilizer subsidies would not be a solution in the short 
run due to its major impact on farmer’s economy. Through our analysis we can 
concluded that the present subsidy policy do not seem to contribute any positive 
effects for India. Even though India is injecting more money in fertilizer 
subsidies, there is no increase in the productivity and the farmers are still in a bad 
position. 
 
Direct subsidies? 
As a result there have been discussions concerning other methods, such as to give 
the subsidies directly to the farmers. As Ashok Gulati, the director of Asia’s 
International Food Policy Research Institute, states: “there is representation from 
several members of the Parliament that is demanding a transfer to a direct subsidy 
regime”. 
 
Possibilities for new entrants 
There has also been focus on subsidizing other and better types of fertilizer mixes. 
R.C. Gupta, deputy director general of industry body Fertilizer Association of 
India says that the focus is now on providing nutrient-based offsets, which would 
help in better targeting of the subsidies and ensure improved fertilizer mix that 
would contain the growing erosion in soil nutrients. Some of the new chemical 
that is going to be subsidizes is sulphur. As Gupta stated “The situation is bound 
to improve now that sulphur will be subsidized.” 
This would give Yara International ASA and its joint venture partner Kribcho the 
opportunity to produce and sell better mixes. 
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Buyer Power  
Furthermore there are also other changes that are planned from the Indian 
government. As mentioned their plans of investing in the rural areas standards, for 
example with better infrastructure such as roads, telecommunication, and water 
supply. This could remove the bottleneck for the fertilizers farmers, especially 
with new roads, as it would make it easier to reach and deliver fertilizer products 
to farmers throughout India.  
 
Results of government investments 
These investments and the planned/ possible future changes made by the 
government should help to increase the farmer’s productivity, and along with the 
deletion of the farmer’s debt, farmer’s economy could a bright future. Given that 
these factors are accomplished it could lead to a possible positive circle 
(Appendix 7), which would lead to higher spending and the farmers risk appetite 
for investments will be heightened.  
 
Government will improve 
India is at the present time in a situation where changes in the way fertilizing 
subsidies are given, needs to be improved, so that the productivity in the 
agricultural sector will increase. 
Our predictions are that India in the long run will improve their present fertilizer 
subsidy policy. 
Yara International ASA`s goal                                                                                               
As Yara International ASA goal states: “will never sacrifice long-term 
performance for short-term payoffs, and will never use long-term focus as an 
excuse for short-term performance” (Yara International ASA 2008).   
Recommendation 
On the basis of above analysis we conclude that it is likely that the fertilizer policy 
regime in India will have a positive change in the future.  
And therefore Yara International ASA should continue further operations in India. 
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Appendix 1 
The Impact of a Subsidy 
Although the analysis of the impact of a tax is important the analysis of the impact 
of a subsidy is more interesting. The analysis is essentially the same, a subsidy 
merely being a negative tax. The effect of a subsidy is to shift the supply curve 
downward by the amount of the subsidy. Effectively this is an increase in supply. 
The graph below shows the results of a subsidy on a market.  
 
In the above graph (and following graphs) Ps represents the price paid to 
consumers after the subsidy is created. Ps' represents the price received by the 
producers, which is the price paid by consumers plus the subsidy. The impact of 
the subsidy is to lower prices for consumers but to increase the price received by 
producers. The benefit of the subsidy is shared by the consumers and producers in 
a proportion that depends upon the relative slopes of the demand and supply 
functions.  
 
The above graph shows the gains in consumers' and producers' surpluses as a 
result of the subsidy. Although the effect of the subsidy seems beneficial the 
important question is the cost of the subsidy relative to the benefits. In the graph 
shown below the cost of the subsidy to the government is the gray rectangle 
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including the colour triangle. The graph shows the balance is negative; i.e., the 
cost of the subsidy is always greater than the benefits to consumers and producers. 
This is an important result of analysis.  
 
The deadweight loss of the subsidy is the amount by which the cost of the subsidy 
exceeds the gains in consumers' and producers' surpluses, the triangles shown in 
pink and blue. The magnitude of the deadweight loss of a tax or subsidy depends 
upon the amount of the tax or subsidy and the change in production that results 
from the tax or subsidy. Specifically  
 
 
Deadweight Loss = (1/2)(amount of tax or subsidy)*ΔQ 
  
where ΔQ is the change in output.  
Since the change in output ΔQ is proportional to the amount of the tax or subsidy 
the deadweight loss is proportional to the square of the tax or subsidy. This means 
that if the tax or subsidy is doubled the deadweight loss increases by a factor of 
four. If the tax or subsidy is tripled the deadweight loss increases by a factor of 
none.  
The relationship between the tax rate and the amount of tax revenue collected is a 
parabola, a form popularized by Art Laffer. The Laffer Curve shows that beyond a 
certain point an increase in the tax rate results in a decrease in tax revenue rather 
than an increase. This relationship was popularized as part of the Supplyside 
Economics of the Reagan Administration.  
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Appendix 3 
 
(The Fertilizer Association of India, 2008) 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
(ENMA 2007) 
 
(ENMA 2007) 
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Appendix 5  
 
Michael Porter’s Five Forces Analysis 
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Appendix 6  
International competitors in India and how they are doing on the stock exchange 
market.  
 
 
 
 
 
Here is a list of the private-sector producers in India.  
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http://www.humateintl.com/productdetail_ProBiotic.htm
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